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NOTES
EXPLORING THE LEGAL AND MORAL BASES FOR
CONDUCTING TARGETED STRIKES OUTSIDE
OF THE DEFINED COMBAT ZONE
JOSHUA BENNETT*
Since 2001 the President has been authorized "to use all nec-
essary and appropriate force" against the al Qaeda network and
the insurgent Taliban regime that provided al Qaeda with safe
haven in Afghanistan while the Taliban regime was in power.' As
a result, Afghanistan has been the site of an active "combat zone"
since October 2001. But U.S.-led targeted strikes have increas-
ingly expanded across international borders as U.S. forces have
sought to capture or kill key individuals in the al Qaeda network
and the deposed Taliban regime who continue to plan and per-
petuate terrorist operations from locations beyond Afghanistan.'
This Note explores the legal and moral bases for conducting
targeted strikes beyond the defined combat zone against individ-
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2012.
1. See Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), Pub. L. No. 107-
40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
2. For a snapshot of the increasing frequency of recent targeted strike
operations, see, for example, Drones and the Law, ECONOMIST, Oct 8, 2011, at 17,
18; Adam Entous,Julian E. Barnes & Siobhan Gorman, CIA Escalates in Pakistan:
Pentagon Diverts Drones From Afghanistan to Bolster U.S. Campaign Next Door, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 2-3, 2010, at Al (discussing the rationale for the increase in drone
attacks in Northern Pakistan against al Qaeda and the Haqqani network in
order to eliminate terrorist "sanctuaries" and "militant havens"); Siobhan
Gorman, Drones Target Terror Plot: CIA Strikes Intensify in Pakistan Amid Heightened
Threats in Europe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2010, at Al (noting the recent spike in
drone attacks in Northern Pakistan against the Haqqani network, an affiliate of
al Qaeda, and increased intelligence regarding the network's planning of ter-
rorist attacks across Europe); Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of
the C.I.A.'s Covert Drone Program, NEw YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36 (providing
an in-depth description of the CIA's covert drone program); Hala Gorani, U.S.
Drones Operating in Yemen, Foreign Minister Says, CNN.com (Nov. 7, 2010, 3:10
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/11/07/yemen.drones/
index.html?hpt=T2 (reporting on the use of U.S. drones in Yemen against al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula).
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uals leading the insurgent and terrorist forces within the combat
zone and elsewhere. In other words, the question explored in
this Note is not "if' but "when" and under what circumstances
are targeted strikes outside the combat zone legally and morally
permissible. This Note explores the principles associated with
the traditional just war doctrine, the modern law of armed con-
flict, and the practical realities and necessary constraints of war
against a non-state enemy. This topic straddles the line between
what the law is and what the law should be. As a practical matter,
however, protests against the United States' strikes have been
fairly muted and, therefore, targeted strikes in certain terrorist
hotbeds outside of the combat zone are not likely to subside.
Therefore, the more relevant question seems to be, as this Note
attempts to explore, under what conditions are targeted strikes
beyond the defined combat zone legally and morally permissible.
Implicit throughout this Note are the themes of an individ-
ual's right to life and due process of law versus the practical
necessity of a state to combat the threat posed by transnational
terrorist organizations. The implications of the question about
targeted strikes against individuals beyond the combat zone can-
not be understated: at stake are fundamental rights of the
targeted individual such as the rights to life and due process.
And hanging in the balance is the safety and security of the citi-
zens that the targeting state seeks to protect.
I. BACKGROUND
Al Qaeda is a transnational non-state organization responsi-
ble for planning and executing scores of high-profile terrorist
attacks. Some of al Qaeda's most notorious attacks include the
1998 simultaneous bombings on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania;' the bombing of the USS Cole while in Aden, Yemen
in October 2000;' the coordinated attacks of September 11, 2001
on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the failed attack
that ended in Shanksville, Pennsylvania;' and through affiliated
organizations, the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005
bombings in London,6 among others.
3. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ArrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COM-
MISSION REPORT, 115-16 (2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
4. Id. at 190-91.
5. See generally id., at 1-14 (describing in minute-by-minute detail the
sequence of events that occurred during the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001).
6. Al-Qaeda Attacks: Killing in the Name of Islam, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2011,
3:12 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/05/al-qaeda
attacks.
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Al Qaeda's organizational structure is complex and frag-
mented. The al Qaeda network is comprised of a hierarchical
central core that provides command and control for the organi-
zation.' This inner leadership circle was based in Afghanistan
prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001 but has since sought
refuge from U.S. air strikes across the border in locations
throughout Pakistan.' Indeed, while most of al Qaeda's opera-
tions are conducted by a network of affiliated organizations, the
intelligence gathered before and following the killing of Osama
bin Laden suggests that the top echelons of al Qaeda's leader-
ship still retained operational control of the organization from
Pakistan.' This network is comprised of franchise cells operating
in locations geographically remote from the al Qaeda headquar-
ters element. These franchise cells include al Qaeda in the Ara-
bian Peninsula ("AQAP"), al Qaeda in East Africa ("AQEA"), al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ("AQIM"), and other associated
organizations, such as al Shabab in Somalia.'o Franchise cells
report to al Qaeda's central command element for general pol-
icy, guidance, funding, and permission to execute a proposed
operation under the al Qaeda banner." Indeed, al Qaeda's
command and control model is one where "dispersed small
groups . . . communicate, coordinate, and conduct their cam-
paigns in a networked manner, without a precise central com-
mand."" As early as 1995, a U.S. State Department Report
assessed that
[m]any of these terrorists-some loosely organized and
some representing groups- . . . operate [ ], increasingly,
7. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 56.
8. See Entous, Barnes & Gorman, supra note 2, at Al.
9. See AVERY PiAw, TARGETING TERRORISTS: A LICENSE TO KILL? 23 (2008);
Leah Farrall, How al Qaeda Works: What the Organization's Subsidiaries Say About Its
Strength, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 128, 133-36 (Mar./Apr. 2011); Barbara Starr & Char-
ley Keyes, U.S. Officials Unveil Videos of bin Laden, CNN.com (May 8, 2011, 6:40
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/07/pakistan.bin.laden.
intelligence/index.html?hpt=T1 (reporting on the intelligence gathered from
bin Laden's compound).
10. See Farrall, supra note 9, at 128-29, 136; see also Ofeibea Quist-Arcton,
Kidnappings Highlight AI-Qaida's Rise in the Sahara, NPR.oRG (Dec. 31, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/31/132489882/kidnappings-highlight-al-qaidas-
rise-in-the-sahara (describing the increase of al Qaeda's presence in "lawless
region [s]" of the Sahara Desert that are "poorly policed").
11. See Farrall, supra note 9, at 135; see also U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
JOINT PUBLICATION 3-26: COUNTERTERRORISM, at II-11 to 11-13 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter COUNTERTERRORISM].
12. PIAw, supra note 9, at 23 (quoting Kevin O'Brien, Networks, Netware
and Information Age Terrorism, in THE NEW TERRORISM (Andrew Tan & Kumar
Ramakrishna eds., 2002)).
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on a global scale. These trans-national terrorists benefit
from modem communications and transportation, have
global sources of funding, are knowledgeable about mod-
ern explosives and weapons, and are much more difficult
to track and apprehend than members of the old estab-
lished groups . . . .3
This horizontal organizational structurel4 enables the feder-
ation of operational cells to seek safe haven in remote regions
that are (1) lawless, and thus lack effective governmental control
to police the region;" or (2) friendly to terrorist cells, enabling
those elements to safely seek refuge under the protection of the
host nation's sovereignty;" or (3) both." Al Qaeda continues to
plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan and abroad, despite the
U.S. armed forces' presence in Afghanistan. By relying on its
nebulous-and, by design, geographically dispersed-organiza-
tional structure, al Qaeda continues to orchestrate and carry out
attacks from locations beyond Afghanistan's borders'"-loca-
tions specifically calculated to fall within one of the three types of
locations described above.
A. What is Terrorism?
A threshold question that therefore arises is "what is terror-
ism"? The inability to give terrorism a definitive meaning has left
a key question unanswered: is terrorism a crime, an act of war, or
something in between? Complicating this problem is the adage
13. JASON BURKE, At QAEDA: CASTING A SHADOW OF TERROR 10 (2003)
(quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTER-
RORISM, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1995 (1996)).
14. See PiAw, supra note 9, at 23.
15. See, e.g., Entous, Barnes & Gorman, supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMIssioN REPORT, supra note 3, at 57 (describing
the symbiotic relationship between the government of Sudan and al Qaeda
thereby allowing bin Laden to locate his organization in Sudan).
17. The mountainous region straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan pro-
vided an ideal combination of autonomy for al Qaeda due to the lack of effec-
tive governmental control as well as a regime-or at least a key figure in the
regime, Mullah Omar-that permitted (or at least tolerated) al Qaeda's pres-
ence. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 66; see also PHILIP B.
HEYMANN &JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR 63
(2005) (listing states, such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Sudan, that lack "effective
control" and other states, such as Syria and Iran, that have governments that are
hostile towards the U.S. and, thus, willing to provide safe haven).
18. See, e.g., Catherine Herridge, Awlaki Allegedly Tied to British Terror Plot,
FoxNEws.coM (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/12/
28/awlaki-allegedly-tied-british-terror-plot/ (reporting that Awlaki's AQAP
organization sought to target Big Ben and the U.S. embassy in London).
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that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.'"
There is no single authoritative definition of terrorism, but sev-
eral definitions have been posed. While arriving at a single defi-
nition is beyond the scope of this Note, posing various
definitions may illustrate themes that are generally thought to
exist in acts of terrorism. For example, the U.S. Department of
Defense defines terrorism as "[t]he calculated use of unlawful
violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear;
intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in
the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideo-
logical."20 The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as the
"[p]remeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant [and military] targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience.""1 Finally, a UN Panel defined terrorism as
any action . . . intended to cause death or serious bodily
harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of
such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a pop-
ulation or to compel a government or an international
organization to carry out or abstain from any act.22
This sampling of definitions illustrates that terrorists seek to
accomplish state or national" objectives through indirect uses of
force. That is, terrorist organizations do not conduct head-on
attacks against state-backed military forces. Instead, terrorist
organizations accomplish their objectives by attacking "soft
19. See, e.g., PLuw, supra note 9, at 7.
20. COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 11, at GL-10.
21. Pu~w, supra note 9, at 14 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF
GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1995, vi (1996) (adding subsequently, as indicated, to its
definition that military installations are also targets that terrorist organizations
attack)).
22. Id. at 10 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,
51-2 (2004)); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 51, para. 2
("Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population are prohibited.") [hereinafter Additional Proto-
col I]; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Ter-
rorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/109, at art. 2, para. 1(b) (Feb.
25, 2000) (defining terrorism as including any act causing death or harm to
those "not taking an active part in . . . hostilities" and "when the purpose of
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any
act").
23. "National" as in a group of people sharing a similar identity or
ideology.
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targets" that are typically not valid military objectives. Therefore,
intense, sustained combat between opposing forces-the type of
force historically seen in combat zones-is unlikely to be found
in a modern conflict with non-state terrorist actors.
To defeat this type of transnational, amorphous enemy, the
United States has engaged in a policy of targeting terrorist
actors.2 ' The policy of targeted strikes on individuals is contro-
versial but, in the main, likely legal when conducted within the
territorial bounds of the combat zone and against legitimate
targets that are subject to military force in times of armed con-
flict.25 Legal and moral questions arise, however, when some of
the preceding criteria are not present or additional variables are
introduced. Factors that complicate the analysis of the legality of
targeted strikes include (1) whether the terrorist target is charac-
terized as a combatant or civilian, 26 (2) whether the attacker is an
authorized belligerent,27 (3) the nature of the target in light of
his geographic location,2 1 (4) the degree of conflict, if any, pre-
24. See OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTER-
RORISM 1 (2011) ("We are bringing targeted force to bear on al-Qa'ida at a time
when its ideology is also under extreme pressure.") [hereinafter NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM]; see also Ken Dilanian, U.S. Outlines New Anti-
Terror Focus: Obama Sees Special Operations and Aerial Drones, Not Wars on Land, as
Key to Defeating Al Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at 7.
25. See, e.g., Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. & Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong.
para. 6 (Mar. 23, 2010) (statement of Prof. Kenneth Anderson), avail-
able at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/
NSSubcommittee/3.23.10_Drones/Anderson.pdf ("[I]n Afghanistan, for
example, the use of drones is functionally identical to the use of [a] missile
fired from a standoff fighter plane that is many miles from the target and fre-
quently over-the-horizon."); Rise of the Drones I: Examining the Legality of
Unmanned Targeting: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. & Foreign Affairs,
111th Cong. 1, 4 (Apr. 28, 2010) (statement of Prof. Mary Ellen O'Connell),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2010042
8OConnell.pdf(stating that "[w]e are still using drones lawfully in the on-going
combat in Afghanistan"; defining the "combat zone" as the place where actual
"fighting or hostilities of an armed conflict occurs").
26. See Nils Melzer, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law
20 (May 2009) [hereinafter ICRC, Direct Participation in Hostilities].
27. This raises the question, which is beyond the scope of this Note, of
whether use of CIA drones falls within the scope of the combatant's privilege.
SeeAdditional Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 43(1). For purposes of confining
this Note to its scope, it is assumed that there is no distinction between CIA-
and military-led operations.
28. See, e.g., KENNETH ANDERSON, HOOVER INST., TARGETED KILLING AND
DRONE WARFARE: How WE CAME TO DEBATE WHETHER THERE IS A 'LEGAL GEOG-
RAPHY OF WAR' (2011), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/documents/FutureChallengesAnderson.pdf. The geographic location
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sent in the target's location, and (5) perhaps the citizenship sta-
tus of the individual targeted. 29 For the purposes of this Note,
the first two factors are assumed to comply with international and
human rights law and the analysis will focus solely on the third
and fourth variables.
B. Historical Use of Targeted Killings
Targeted killings are lawful under certain prescribed condi-
tions. A United Nations study has defined "targeted killings" as
the use of intentional and deliberate lethal force against a spe-
cific individual (or specific individuals) identified in advance by
the targeting force.o The study distinguishes valid exercises of
targeted strikes from other terms that "ha [ve] sometimes been
interchangeably used, such as 'extrajudicial execution', 'sum-
mary execution', and 'assassination', all of which are, by defini-
tion, illegal."" Other commentators have referred to the
practice using other charged language.32 But the practice
described-irrespective of its label-has been deemed valid
under certain prescribed conditions.
Targeting non-state actors who plan and perpetuate acts of
terror is, however, more controversial. The traditional notions of
terrorism, guerilla tactics, and asymmetric warfare recognized
insurgent actors as "farmers by day and fighters by night" subject
to a "revolving door" of Geneva protections whereby the actors
were valid military targets only during their "direct participation
in hostilities."" When not directly participating in hostilities,
however, a state's police force would likely be the appropriate
means to capture such actors." But the al Qaeda network is illus-
analysis requires also an additional consideration of whether the use of military
force is authorized in such a location-the next point.
29. This variable is also beyond the scope of this Note but presented here
for context.
30. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execu-
tions, Study on Targeted Killings, paras. 7-10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6
(May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) (describing the United Nation's definitions
of and policy on targeted killings).
31. Id. para. 10 (citation omitted).
32. See PIAw, supra note 9, at 3 (quoting Steven R. David, Israel's Policy of
Targeted Killing, 17 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 111, 112 (2003) (defining targeted kill-
ing as the "intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals
undertaken with explicit governmental approval") (emphasis added)).
33. ICRC, Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 72.
34. Eighth U.N. Cong. on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforce-
ment Officials (Sept. 7, 1990), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/
firearms.pdf [hereinafter Use of Force and Firearms].
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trative of a "new terrorism" that has taken root in the latter part
of the 1980s.15 These are not the farmers moonlighting as free-
dom fighters to expel a foreign occupying force in the name of
national liberation, for example. On the contrary, these ter-
rorists are full-time operatives that seek to inflict "massive, indis-
criminate civilian carnage, and their powerful new means to
accomplish this objective is the dispersed international underground
network capable of exploiting the political spaces opened by failed and
rogue states to plan, train, and acquire the most destructive availa-
ble weapons."" This new form of terrorism is especially difficult
to combat because communications technology allows for coordi-
nated planning and execution to effectively occur from geo-
graphically remote cells." The individual components of
modern terrorism-indiscriminate attacks on civilians, a transna-
tional footprint that "exploit[s] bases in rogue and failed states,"
and a loose federation of "semi-independent cells"-are not
themselves novel; rather, it is the systematic combination of these
attributes that have given rise to this new breed of terrorism that
makes this modern threat unique.38
Moreover, the notion of targeted killing using military force
is not a novel concept. The U.S. military has combined intelli-
gence with military operations to track down and "surgically kill
[the enemy's] leadership" since at least the early twentieth cen-
35. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 72; PIAw, supra
note 9, at 19.
36. PLAw, supra note 9, at 19 (emphasis added); see generally THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 47-70 (describing the events and condi-
tions that enabled al Qaeda to flourish and the basis for al Qaeda's radical
breed of terrorism); id. at 72 (stating, as an example of this radical breed of
terrorism, Ramzi Yousef's desire to kill 250,000 people during the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing).
37. BuRKE, supra note 13, at 10-11. But see Leah M. Campbell, Note,
Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to Strike Sudan and
Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1067, 1072-73 (2000) (quoting Wallace F. War-
riner, The Unilateral Use of Coercion Under International Law: A Legal Analysis of the
United States Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37 NAVAL L. REv. 49, 76-77 (1988))
(explaining that in 1976, a terrorist operation might have been "planned in
West Germany by Palestinian Arabs, executed in Israel by terrorists recruited in
Japan with weapons acquired in Italy but manufactured in Russia, supplied by
an Algerian diplomat, and financed with Libyan money"). But a major premise
of this Note is that modern terrorist actors, unlike the West Germany hypotheti-
cal quoted, seek geographic dispersal in certain, specific states that are unable
or unwilling to capture the non-state terrorist actors.
38. See PIAw, supra note 9, at 20 (describing further that the synergy
resulting from the three previously existing, but separately implemented, attrib-
utes has given rise to a fourth attribute: access to more destructive weaponry).
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tury.39 But a series of failed assassination attempts eventually led
to Executive Order 12,333 prohibiting U.S. government involve-
ment in assassination attempts.4 0 Following al Qaeda's 1998
bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, however,
President Clinton expressed his rationale for implementing the
use of targeted military strikes against al Qaeda in Afghanistan:
America has battled terrorism for many years. Where possi-
ble, we've used law enforcement and diplomatic tools to
wage the fight. The long arm of American law has reached
out around the world and brought to trial those guilty of
attacks ....
But there have and will be times when law enforce-
ment and diplomatic tools are simply not enough, when
our very national security is challenged, and when we must
take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citi-
zens. With compelling evidence that the bin Laden net-
work of terrorist groups was planning to mount further
attacks against Americans and other freedom-loving peo-
ple, I decided America must act.4 '
The targeted strike that killed Anwar al Awlaki, an Ameri-
can-born cleric, is an illustration of the complex nature of the
legal and moral issues present when targeting transnational ter-
rorist actors. Prior to the strike that killed Al Awlaki, he was
believed to be somewhere in Yemen and was leading one of al
Qaeda's most active franchise cells in the Arabian Peninsula: al
Qaeda in Yemen.4 2 He had been tied to various terrorist plots
including the 2009 Fort Hood shootings, the attempted "under-
wear bombing" on Christmas Day 2009, and the foiled cargo
39. See id., at 94-96 (describing military operations against specific indi-
viduals including a 1916 expedition to hunt down "Pancho" Villa in Mexico,
Admiral Yamamoto in the South Pacific during World War II, and Cuban leader
Fidel Castro in the 1960s).
40. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,952 (1981) ("No per-
son employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall
engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.").
41. Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in
Afghanistan and Sudan, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1643 (Aug. 20, 1998). But
see Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice ofLaw Against Terrorism, 4J. NAT'L SECUurIY
L. & Pot'v 343, 347 (2010) (citing Ronald Reagan, Letter of Transmittal, The
White House (Jan. 29, 1987) ("[To] grant combatant status to irregular forces
even if they do not satisfy the traditional requirements . . . would endanger
civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal them-
selves.")); Campbell, supra note 37, at 1096 (arguing that the 1998 strikes were a
violation of international law).
42. See Herridge, supra note 18.
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plane bomb plot."3 As such, al Awlaki was being targeted.4 4 But
the United States was not conducting sustained combat opera-
tions in Yemen, nor is Yemen geographically situated adjacent to
a recognized combat zone, like Pakistan, where a valid target
might flee across the border with U.S. forces in hot pursuit that
began within the heart of the combat zone in Afghanistan."
Therefore, the al Awlaki scenario provides factual context to con-
sider when exploring the extent of the legal and moral authority
to conduct targeted strikes in a location beyond the recognized
combat zone.
1I. FRAMING THE ISSUES
Thus, the following question arises: what are the legal and
moral criteria that must be present to justify an expansion of
targeted strikes against transnational non-state actors who plan
and perpetuate terrorist attacks from beyond the defined combat
area?
As with other fields of law, when the nature of warfare
evolves, so too has the law.46 Warfare has evolved in response to
a new breed of terrorism. As a result, war is an increasingly
sophisticated and nuanced endeavor. With increased sophistica-
43. See, e.g., CNN Wire Staff, Yemen-based al Qaeda Group Claims Responsibil-
ity for Parcel Bomb Plot, CNN (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/
WORLD/meast/ I 1/05/yemen.security.concern/index.html; Gorani, supra
note 2. But see Declaration of Prof. Barnard Haykel, at paras. 7-9, Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-1469 (JDB)), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/HaykelDeclaration.100810.PDF (stating the
AQAP is a "fragmented group numbering no more than a couple of hundred
men at most," that the "movement is not sufficiently coherent to be organized
in a stable fashion," and that there is a mistaken appearance that AQAP is larger
than it actually is).
44. See Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, C.LA. Strike Kills
U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 1, 2011, at Al, A8.
45. Which is, itself, also a complex and controversial legal problem. See
Mary Ellen O'Connell, The International Law of Drones, ASIL INSIGHTS (Nov. 12,
2010), http://asil.org/files/2010/insights/insights_101112.pdf. But it is clear
that if a strike on an individual in Yemen can be legally justified, then the case
for a strike in Pakistan's lawless border region will involve less complex legal
analysis. But that is not to say that if a strike is permissible in Yemen it is, there-
fore, automatically permissible in Pakistan. The relevant calculus of factors
must be reassessed in each case, as described in Section II, infra. Another
potential complicating factor to the targeting analysis, which is beyond the
scope of this Note, was Anwar al Awlaki's status as an American citizen.
46. See Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 Nov. 1945-1 Oct. 1946, in MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 152 (2d ed. 2009) ("This law [refer-
ring to the law of war] is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the
needs of a changing world.").
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tion comes increased complexity that does not fit neatly into pre-
viously defined categories: armed conflict versus criminal activity,
international versus non-international conflict, lawful combatant
versus criminal perpetrator, and, possibly, combat zone versus
neutral (or perhaps "safe haven") states. It is insufficient to sim-
ply capture and occupy territory in the combat zone. Now, an
effective war strategy requires a multi-faceted approach, espe-
cially in the context of a non-state enemy, while staying true to
the overarching principles of the law of armed conflict and the
just war tradition. Defeating non-state actors involves rooting out
deeply entrenched and widely scattered enemy actors and deci-
sion makers. To allow those participants to seek safe haven
outside the combat zone would create an undesirable require-
ment for full-scale expansion of the war through invasion and
occupation of safe haven states in order to accomplish the nar-
rower military objective of rooting out the planners of large-scale
terrorist attacks that the domestic authorities in those locations
are unable or unwilling to undertake.48 Therefore, in modern
warfare against non-state actors, the military must consider and
understand the inter-relationships between "political, military,
economic, social, information [al] and infrastructure" systems in
47. U.S. JoINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLIcATION 3-24: COUNTERIN-
SURGENCY OPERATIONS, at x, (2009) [hereinafter COUNTERINSURGENCY
OPERATIONS].
48. HIEMANN & KAYYEM, supra note 17, at 63. But see Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights,
Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions, Comm'n on
Hum. Rts., para. 41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7 (Dec. 22, 2004) (by Philip
Alston).
[I]t is increasingly common to read arguments along the lines that
"targeting and eliminating known terrorists is more efficient and costs
fewer lives than waging conventional war." While there are a great
many empirical arguments that might be made in order to show that
such strategies will be counterproductive, the point is that such pro-
posals directly undermine the essential foundations of human rights
law. Empowering Governments to identify and kill "known terrorists"
places no verifiable obligation upon them to demonstrate in any way
that those against whom lethal force is used are indeed terrorists, or to
demonstrate that every other alternative had been exhausted. While it
is portrayed as a limited "'exception" to international norms, it actu-
ally creates the potential for an endless expansion of the relevant cate-
gory to include any enemies of the State ....
Id. (footnote omitted). But as this Note argues, and as supported by the tradi-
tional notions of the just war doctrine, limiting principles can and do exist. See
Augustinian philosophy of the just war doctrine, JOINT TARGETING, and state-
ment of Prof. Anderson, infta notes 78-79, 87, and 110, respectively. See also
section III.B, infra, for legal and moral safeguards to mitigate the risk of arbi-
trary uses of targeted strikes.
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the non-state actor's operational environment, "without regard to
geographic boundaries" in order to identify the key operational
nodes and the circumstances present on the ground in the
enemy actor's location, and then prioritize those nodes in terms
of military objectives in light of the realities of political borders.4 9
Based on that prioritized list of potential targets, an informed
decision can then be made about the necessity to conduct a
targeted strike operation. A combat zone defined by metes and
bounds may be effective for the traditional notion of armed con-
flict, but is ineffective when organizations exploit political
boundaries to carry out their operations from safe haven states.
Instead, to define the limits of the battlespace, one must identify
the functional nodes (i.e., key actors and facilities), understand
how those nodes interrelate, analyze the full range of options to
address the threat, and then prioritize those nodes according to
the principles of military necessity, proportionality, humanity,
and discrimination when making a decision to strike (or not to
strike) a target in a location beyond the geographic location of
the identifiable armed forces.
That said, the combat zone is not boundless. Options other
than resort to military force are available to capture a terrorist
cell in, say, Hamburg, Germany that are not available in certain
areas of Yemen or certain "lawless" regions of Africa."o The legal
and moral legitimacy of combat operations decreases as the con-
templated strike strays from the critical mass of hostile fighting.
In other words, the decision to target should be viewed as a
calculus-and not a categorical geographic decision-based on
the previously identified factors derived from the just war doc-
trine, including necessity (i.e., importance to military objectives),
proximity to actual combat, and reliable alternative courses of
action in light of the location of the targeted individual."'
49. COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, supra note 47, at VIII-2 (emphasis
added); U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60: JOINT TARGETING,
at 11-5, (2007) [hereinafter JoIrr TARGETING].
50. See, e.g., Quist-Arcton, supra note 10. But see Anthony Dworkin, Law
and the Campaign Against Terrorism: The View from the Pentagon, CRIMES OF WAR
PROJEcT (Dec. 16, 2002), http://web.archive.org/web/20101121092443/http:/
/crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-pentagon.html ("According to these rules of
engagement, an al-Qaeda member on the streets of a European city like
Hamburg could lawfully be targeted.").
51. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The
Obama Administration and International Law, Speech Before the Annual Meet-
ing of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/139119.htm ("[W]hether a partic-
ular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon consid-
erations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the
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If the principle of military necessity tolerates civilian death
as the unintentional (but inevitable) by-product of military
necessity,52 why should it not tolerate a similar cost-benefit
calculus of intruding upon sovereign countries by targeting trans-
national belligerents who exploit political boundaries to seek
safe haven in states unable or unwilling to capture them under
the traditional law enforcement power of the state? To be sure,
the toleration for collateral damage should diminish as the dis-
tance of the contemplated targeted strike increases from the area
of actual hostilities. But the factors should nevertheless be
weighed and not summarily dismissed because the individual was
simply in one location and not another. Indeed, this balancing
approach appears to have been the methodology employed when
deciding to target Osama bin Laden in his suburban hideout in
Pakistan by opting for a special forces raid and not by resorting
to heavier firepower with stand-off weapons.
III. THE LEGAL AND MoRAL LANDSCAPE
The morality of war and the methods employed in the
course of armed conflict are based, in large part, on the princi-
ples stemming from the just war doctrine." Principles such as
necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity provide the
moral precepts for resort to and conduct in armed conflict.
Using these principles as its foundation, the modern legal frame-
work for the law of armed conflict developed in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries and is codified in a series of almost uni-
versally accepted treaties. The United Nations Charter-specifi-
cally, the provisions restricting the use of force and authorizing
threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and abil-
ity of those states to suppress the threat the target poses."). The controversy
surrounding Dean Koh's statement, from a doctrinal perspective, is that it
implies that there are degrees of sovereignty, which is inconsistent with the doc-
trine of sovereign equality. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 1[
5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). But sovereignty includes both the
right to be free from outside interference along with the obligation to police
matters within one's borders. It is apparent, at least from a practical point of
view, that such policing is not equal among all sovereign states. See Drones II:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. & Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 7
(2010) (statement of Prof. Kenneth Anderson), available at http://oversight.
house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/20100428Anderson.pdf ("The diplo-
matic fiction of the 'sovereign equality' of states makes it difficult to say, as a
matter of international law that, yes, Yemen is different from France, but of
course that is true.").
52. LARRY MAY, ERIc ROVIE & STEVE VINER, THE MORALITY OF WAR: CIASSI-
CAL. AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 160 (2006) (discussing the philosophical doc-
trine of double effects).
53. O'CONNELL, supra note 46, at 118.
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the use of self-defense, and the Security Council's power to
authorize force-provides the criteria for resorting to force.
The Geneva Conventions regime governs the conduct of wars
occurring in international and non-international settings, catego-
rizes the actors, and provides protections to the various classes of
people, including combatants, non-combatants, and civilians.
The Geneva Conventions', and more broadly, the law of
armed conflict's desire for clarity of definitions in order to mini-
mize confusion as to the status of the various actors located
within a combat zone, however, is anything but clear in the con-
text of conflict with a transnational terrorist organization. 5 The
analysis of whether a targeted strike on a terrorist operative is
permissible is fraught with legal ambiguity. The legal analysis
contains many decision points which can affect the outcome: (1)
whether a particular act of terrorism is a crime or an act of war;
(2) whether actors who carry out such attacks are combatants or
some other category of person within the Geneva paradigm; (3)
if considered acts of war, whether a transnational terrorist organ-
ization's attacks are international or non-international in nature,
thereby invoking the relevant rules in the corresponding Addi-
tional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions; and (4) if in the non-
international conflict setting, whether the structure of a transna-
tional terrorist organization such as al Qaeda provides the requi-
site degree of organization, along with the necessary amount of
intensity and duration in fighting, to be classified as an armed
conflict. Throughout this process, if there is doubt as to whether
the targeted individual is a valid target, the individual is to be
considered a civilian, and therefore protected under the law of
armed conflict."
If the analysis survives the preceding gauntlet of ambiguity,
then the proposed targeted strike must undergo additional scru-
tiny-if not outright denial-if either the target is beyond the
recognized combat zone or if the target, under the domestic law
of the state proposing the targeted strike, happens to be a citizen
of that state.
A. Doctrinal Framework for the Use of Military Force
The law of armed conflict, in the context of a traditional
state conflict, requires a series of categorical determinations in
order to arrive at the final analysis of whether military force is
54. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; art. 51 & art. 42; infra notes 72-74.
55. ICRC, Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 5.
56. Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 50, para. 1.
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appropriate in a given situation. One method of navigating the
doctrinal framework might proceed as follows:
* Military Force versus Law Enforcement Force: The first deter-
mination required is whether the proposed force is that of a
military or law enforcement nature.
* Jus ad Bellum versus Jus in Bello: If the force is of a military
degree, the next question is to determine whether such
action is a resort to force or whether the force proposed is to
be applied in an ongoing armed conflict. Implicit in this
dichotomy is the analysis of geography and the location(s) of
the combat zone if the analysis proceeds as an in bello inquiry.
* Necessity and Proportionality: If the action is an initial resort
to force, follow-up analysis will be required as to whether such
force is necessary (i.e., is it a last resort) and whether the pro-
posed action is a proportional response. That is, is the propo-
nent of military force responding to an act of war or merely a
crime, and where does an act of terrorism fit along that spec-
trum (assuming it is a spectrum, and not a categorically differ-
ent classification paradigm)?" If the proposed strike is to
occur in an in bello situation, the necessity and proportionality
analysis must accomplish a "concrete and direct military
objective. "58
* International versus Non-International Armed Conflict: On
the other hand, if the proposed use of force is in the context
of an ongoing armed conflict, questions of whether the con-
flict is one of an international or non-international variant
may determine the degree of intensity and organization
required by the non-state actor to show that armed conflict
exists in the location of the proposed strike.
* Target's "Geneva Status": In either case-international or
non-international armed conflict-another step is required; a
determination must be made on whether the individual is a
combatant, and therefore a valid target, or is a civilian, or
otherwise."
* Target's "Citizenship Status": Finally, if the individual is a
valid target pursuant to the Geneva's classification paradigm,
a final step is required in order to determine what protec-
tions, if any, one's citizenship provides in situations where a
57. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
58. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 51 para. 5(b).
59. This step is included in the analysis for context and will not be ana-
lyzed in this Note; it is assumed, for purposes of this Note, that the individual
targeted is a valid target at the time of targeting.
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citizen takes up arms in a location beyond the targeting coun-
try's borders.6 0
1. The Permissibility of Force in the Military versus Law
Enforcement Contexts.
The threshold question in considering whether a proposed
targeted strike is permissible is to first determine whether the
proposed action has a military or civilian law enforcement quality
to it. The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials recognizes that civilian law enforcement
officers may use lethal force when such action is "unavoidable""
and that such force must be used with "weapons and ammunition
that would allow for a differentiated use of force."62 Conversely,
with the use of military force, there is a presumption that deadly
force may be used, but in a discretionary manner limited strictly
by the necessity to accomplish a military objective, proportional
to the objective desired to be accomplished, and discriminating
between lawful targets and civilians. In other words, in the con-
text of the lex specialis of the law of armed conflict, permissible
use of military force does not have a default presumption in favor
of the rights to life and due process during valid exercises of such
force in times of, or resort to, armed conflict.6 3
The distinction between military and law enforcement uses
of force is premised, however, upon the assumption that there is
a difference between the effects of the force used by military and
law enforcement authorities. In practice, however, there is no
necessary difference with the death toll stemming from a military
operation employing precision strike technology as compared to
a police raid upon a fortified hideout. Both, targeted strikes and
law enforcement raids can be equally deadly to innocent bystand-
ers. Certainly, military operations that involve the use of
unguided weapons" dropped on targets have a higher likelihood
60. This step is likewise in the analysis for context and will not be
addressed in depth in this Note.
61. Use of Force and Firearms, supra note 34, 1 5.
62. Id. 1 2.
63. But see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI) A, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI)A (Dec. 16, 1966) ("Every
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217(III) (Dec.
10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.");
id. at art. 11 (guaranteeing those charged with a "penal offence" the right to
due process).
64. Unguided weapons, or "dumb bombs," are those types of bombs and
projectiles that lack onboard navigation systems to actively steer itself to a spe-
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for an increased death toll. But the use of guided missile tech-
nology with hyper-precise targeting and techniques used to miti-
gate the size and direction of the weapon's blast radius have
made for increasingly precise strikes with minimal collateral
damage thus providing at least some differentiated scale of force.
Two well-known police raid episodes in the United States illus-
trate the point that a targeted strike using armed force is not
necessarily more lethal to third parties as compared to a law
enforcement raid. Consider the deaths stemming from the
sieges at Ruby Ridge and Waco in 1992 and 1993, respectively.
The Ruby Ridge incident involved an attempt by U.S. Marshalls
and, later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to appre-
hend Randall Weaver for trafficking illegal weapons." After
Weaver shot and killed two U.S. Marshalls, an FBI sniper team
responded to the escalating situation. The sniper team received
specialized rules of engagement that "before a surrender
announcement was made [the sniper team] could and should
shoot all armed adult males appearing outside the cabin."" Dur-
ing the ordeal, a federal agent, Weaver's wife, and his son were
killed. Additionally, Weaver and his partner, Kevin Harris, were
injured. In the incident that occurred in Waco, Texas, four fed-
eral agents were killed and sixteen agents were wounded after
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms sought to execute
a search warrant for a stockpile of illegal weapons." During the
ensuing fifty-one day standoff, seventy-five of the people holed
up in the compound were killed when David Koresh, the group's
leader, ignited the compound during an attempt by the FBI to
raid the compound."
To be sure, while law enforcement raids seek to apprehend a
suspect, when possible, the goal of a targeted military strike is to
kill the individual being targeted while minimizing, if not elimi-
nating altogether, the death toll of bystanders not targeted.
Moreover, the Waco and Ruby Ridge episodes have been viewed
cific point. See Tom Harris, How Smart Bombs Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Mar. 20,
2003), http://science.howstuffworks.coM/smart-bomb.htm.
65. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTIcE, REPORT OF THE RUBY RIDGE TASK FORCE TO THE
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF
IMPROPER GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT IN THE INVESTIGATION, APPREHENSION AND
PROSECUTION OF RANDALL C. WEAVER AND KEVIN L. HARRIS 2 (1994), available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/opr/readingroom/rubyreportcover_-39.pdf [hereinaf-
ter RUBY RIDGE REPORT].
66. Id. at 4.
67. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ArrORNEY GENERAL ON
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as instances where law enforcement exercised excessive uses of
force.6 ' But if a major terrorist operative were holed up in a for-
tified location with an armed security detail, is it not reasonable
to expect a result similar to Waco or Ruby Ridge at the hands of
the state's police authority, especially considering that terrorists
seek safe haven in locations that either permit or cannot restrict
their presence?70 Proper use of precision-strike technology-
given its short response time after receipt of reliable intelligence,
its element of surprise, and therefore, its ability to strike before a
shootout ensues-when combined with techniques to mitigate
the blast radius of the weapon, allows military forces to accom-
plish the desired objectives on terms designed to minimize the
loss of life to those surrounding the target. To be sure, drones
and other precision weapons have unintentionally killed inno-
cent civilians. But so has the use of law enforcement authority,
even at the hands of highly trained police organizations. As the
precision of "surgical strike" weapons increase, when coupled
with reliable intelligence prompting the strike, the gap between
the traditional notions of military and law enforcement opera-
tions against transnational terrorist actors will continue to
close," thereby making the decision on whether to conduct a
targeted strike dependent upon the factors present in the pro-
posed strike and not a binary decision based on geographic loca-
tion. Such factors might include the location of the target
relative to innocent civilians, the likelihood of a shootout from
the target's security detail (if present) if a police raid were exe-
cuted, the reliability of the state's police force to apprehend the
individual, the nature of the underlying reason for capturing or
killing this person, and whether such a reason is consistent with
the doctrines of military necessity and proportionality.
69. See id. (navigate to "Closing") ("The events at the Branch Davidian
compound outside Waco, Texas were exceptional and required an-exceptional
response by law enforcement."); RUBY RIDGE REPORT, supra note 65, at 7.
70. See supra notes 15-17.
71. See Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington's Phantom War:
The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan, 90 FOREIGN Ave. 12, 13 (July/Aug.
2011) (stating that "over the life of the [drone] program, the percentage of
fatalities who were militants has been around 80 percent; in 2010, that figure
rose to 95 percent" and that the "increase in accuracy is likely [or at least was]
the result of better coordination between Pakistani and U.S. intelligence agen-
cies, the smaller missiles now fired by the drones, and the drones' increasing
ability to linger many hours over a target, which better allows their U.S. pilots to
distinguish militants from civilians."); see also NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 24, at 5 (respecting fundamental civil rights by
"ensuring that [counterterrorism] policies and tools are narrowly tailored and
applied to achieve specific, concrete security gains").
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2. Necessity and Proportionality of Military Force in jus ad
Bellum and jus in Bello.
Use of military force is permitted when in a state of armed
conflict, in circumstances of self-defense, or when otherwise
authorized by the UN Security Council. The resort to armed
conflict is limited by UN Charter Article 2(4),7 prohibiting the
"threat or use of force," Article 51,7 recognizing the "inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense," and Article 42,
granting the UN Security Council the power to authorize the use
of armed force.
The law of armed conflict is divided into two fields that
share some degree of overlap. The first field concerns the crite-
ria required in order to resort to the use of force (jus ad bellum)
and the second field focuses on the conduct and humanitarian
concerns during the course of the war (jus in bello) .7 The tradi-
tional requirements of necessity and proportionality apply to
both jus ad bellum and jus in bello but take on slightly different-
but increasingly convergent-meanings depending on the con-
text used. Use of military force is legally permissible if it lies
within the scope of self-defense, as defined in the UN Charter, or
is otherwise authorized by the UN Security Council.7 ' The
72. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state . . . .").
73. See U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."); see
also Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War, supra note 25, at 2
(statement of Prof. Anderson) (describing the two categories of authorization
for use of military force as "the customary international law doctrine of self-
defense .. . [and] the narrower law of armed conflict"); Drones II (statement of
Prof. Anderson), supra note 51, at para. 8.
74. See U.N. Charter art. 42 ("Should the Security Council consider that
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be neces-
sary to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
75. JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE
Bv STATES 1 (2004).
76. Indeed, necessity and proportionality have different meanings not
only when used in the jus ad bellum versus jus in bello context but also when used
in the context of before and after the ratification of the U.N. Charter as well.
See id. at 1-27 (describing the development of the necessity and proportionality
principles).
77. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 & art. 51, supra notes 72-73; Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 215 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Case]
(stating that self-defense is a term of art under Article 51 meaning "the right of
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exceptions to the twin goals of peace and diplomacy carved out
in the UN Charter are premised on the moral principles of the
just war doctrine, as developed through the ages by philosophers
such as Augustine, Aquinas, and Grotius, among others.7 8 To
reconcile the conflict of Christianity's pacifist philosophy with
the practical necessity of deterring foreign aggression, the moral
principles advanced in the just war doctrine "not only permitted
Christians to protect themselves against marauding bandits, but
also opened the way to justifying force in response to a broad
array of provocations.""
In jus ad bellum, necessity is established "after all peaceful
means [of resolution] have failed."o Necessity in the jus in bello
context is "reflected in the doctrine of military necessity,"'i
which provides that
[a] ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so
far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutraliza-
tion, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a defi-
nite military advantage.
The provision goes on to state that "[i]n case of doubt
whether an object . .. is being used to make an effective contri-
bution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so
used."8
Proportionality also takes on different meanings depending
on whether it is used in thejus ad bellum orjus in bello context. In
determining whether to use military force, proportionality first
considers whether military force is an appropriate response in
the first instance." If that determination is affirmatively made,
then the extent of the response must be assessed in the jus in bello
the victim state to use significant offensive military force on the territory of a
state legally responsible for the attack").
78. See generally MAv, ROVIE & VINER, supra note 52 (describing the devel-
opment of the just war doctrine through the writings of major philosophers).
79. O'CONNELL, supra note 46, at 118.
80. See GARDAM, supra note 75, at 5. Necessity, in the jus ad bellum context,
was an empty requirement prior to the existence of the U.N. Charter because
states were presumed to possess a sovereign right to wage war. The Charter
limited that presumption to instances of self-defense, as defined in Article 51,
and authorized actions by the U.N. Security Council, as specified in Article 42.
81. Id. at 7.
82. Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 52, para. 2; see alsoJOINT
TARGETING, supra note 49, at E-1.
83. Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 52, para. 3.
84. GARDAM, supra note 75, at 11.
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context. The "authoritative statement on proportionality" 5 in
this latter context can be found in Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Convention, prohibiting "attack[s] which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated"" and to "[r]efrain from deciding to
launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."8 7
The law of armed conflict also incorporates the principles of
humanity, which prohibit "employment of arms, projectiles, or
material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering,"" and dis-
tinction, "requir[ing] both attacker and defender to distinguish
between combatants and noncombatants, as well as between mili-
tary objectives and protected property, locations, or objects.""
Together, these four principles, under the law of armed conflict,
are required in order to exercise the use of force legitimately.
The two legal bases for resort to use of military force-state
of armed conflict and self-defense-will be analyzed in turn.
a. Is the "War on Terror" an Armed Conflict?
On December 20, 2001, after the U.S.-led forces toppled the
Taliban regime, the UN Security Council resolved to
"[s]upport[ ] international efforts to root out terrorism, in keep-
ing with the Charter of the United Nations" and "[a] uthorize[d]
the Member States participating in the International Security
Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its man-
date."o Using this as its basis, one theory for justifying the use of
85. Eric T.Jensen, Targeting ofPersons and Property, in THE WAR ON TERROR
AND THE LAWS OF WAR 37, 52 (Michael W. Lewis ed., 2009).
86. Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 51 para. 5(b).
87. Id. at art. 57 para. 2(iii). The U.S. military specifically incorporates
these doctrines into its targeting process. See, e.g.,Joirr TARGETING, supra note
49, at ix ("[T]he focus [of targeting] should be on creating the desired effects
that support the [military] objectives rather than simply servicing a list of cus-
tomary targets . . . ."); id. at 1-8 ("Every target nominated [for a strike] should in
some way contribute to attaining the [military] objectives."); id. at 11-5 (requir-
ing " [d]etailed analysis" of each proposed target "linking targets back to target-
ing objectives"); id. at E-1 (defining necessity, proportionality, humanity
(unnecessary suffering), and distinction (discrimination)).
88. JoINT TARGETING, supra note 49, at E-1.
89. Id. at E-2.
90. S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001) (emphasis
removed).
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force against terrorist actors is that the UN Security Council
affirmatively authorized military action against terrorist and
insurgent Taliban actors in Afghanistan. An alternative theory
for the United States' military action, to be analyzed in the next
subsection, centers on the argument that the United States is in
an ongoing self-defense action.
The first major determination on whether targeted strikes
against non-state terrorist actors are legally and morally sanc-
tioned is to consider whether an actual state of war exists
between the United States and the transnational terrorist actors.
Armed conflict exists "whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between govern-
mental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State."" One must look to objective criteria for
this determination and not mere declarations of war in order to
legally resort to the use of force." If a state of war does not exist
then the authorization to resort to force must reside either under
the doctrine of self-defense or under the state's law enforcement
power in order to satisfy the legal requirements for the use of
force.93 Thus, the distinction between a crime and an act of war
is a question of degree and not a categorical decision,94 and the
presumption of the type of force authorized is determined by the
initial determination of police versus military force.
It stands, therefore, that an objective determination of
whether armed conflict exists must be made in order to deter-
mine the type of force authorized. One approach might be a
strict quantitative method to measure the number of attacks to
gauge whether a certain minimum threshold of sustained inten-
sity exists within a certain geographic location in order to find
that a state of war exists beyond the capacity of the civilian law
enforcement's power to control. This method fails to capture,
however, strategies employed by insurgent forces and terrorist
organizations that are perpetuating attacks on "soft targets" and
91. Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
92. INT'L LAw Ass'N, USE OF FORCE COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT ON THE
MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2010).
93. Use of Force and Firearms, supra note 34, 1 9.
94. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myth of
the Global War on Terror, 12 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMIP. L. 1, 3 (2005) (quoting Chris-
topher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLIcT 39, 42 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995))
("[O]nly when fighting reaches a level of intensity which exceeds that of such
isolated clashes will it be treated as an armed conflict to which the rules of
international humanitarian law apply.").
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are not interested in combating the regular military force head-
on or holding a specific geographic area. Rather, such forces
seek to achieve objectives other than defeating the opposing mili-
tary force. Therefore, an alternative basis for measuring whether
a certain minimum threshold of intensity exists might be to use a
qualitative analysis. This form of analysis takes into account the
frequency of attacks and the magnitude of each attack. In other
words, frequent smaller-scale coordinated attacks or non-peri-
odic larger scale attacks might each provide objective evidence
that a state of war exists, and justification to resort to military
force under a qualitative approach.
To the extent that a certain minimum threshold of intensity
must be shown to exist, one view is that such intensity is inher-
ently limited to a certain geographic location.9 Beyond such
locations, this methodology will likely find that the intensity of
conflict is too sporadic and does not satisfy the intense concen-
tration of conflict for establishing, objectively, that a state of
armed conflict exists. As a result, the sporadic, geographically
diffused acts are insufficient to depart from the default law
enforcement power into the realm of authority that permits the
use of military force. The practical significance of restricting the
use of military force lies in the presumption of how force may be
utilized. In a normal state of affairs, that is, when not in a state of
armed conflict, the use of deadly force is permitted by law
enforcement officers only in
self-defence or defence of others against the imminent
threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetra-
tion of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to
life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and
resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape,
and only when less extreme means are insufficient to
achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal
use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoida-
ble in order to protect life.9 6
In the context of military force, however, there is no default
presumption against the use of deadly force against valid targets,
subject to the constraints of the just war doctrine as established
in the modern law of armed conflict.
But the geographic limitation to where the armed conflict is
occurring misses the mark in the context of conflict with non-
state terrorist actors. Non-state actors who participate in the
95. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 845, 854-55 (2009).
96. Use of Force and Firearms, supra note 34, 1 9.
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planning and leadership roles of terrorist organizations exploit
the sovereign protection of weak or complicit states to continue
to perpetuate their attacks from locations known to be beyond
the reach of the local law enforcement power. These non-state
actors are not confined to any geographic region where their col-
laborators may be located. Instead, they are free to disperse and
perpetuate their attacks from geographically remote locations.
The Tadie court recognized that the "temporal and geographical
scope of both internal and international armed conflicts
extend [ ] beyond the exact time and place of hostilities.""
Rather than applying an arbitrarily defined boundary to the com-
bat zone, the sounder and more practical approach, consistent
with the doctrines of military necessity, proportionality, distinc-
tion, and humanity, is the approach adopted in the current U.S.
military targeting analysis. Consideration of the "political, mili-
tary, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure" systems
that factor into the non-state terrorist actor's capability to plan
and perpetuate attacks from safe haven states must be evaluated
"without regard to geographic boundaries" and prioritized in
terms of the desired military objectives sought to be accom-
plished." If, and only if, the objective to be gained outweighs
(perhaps, significantly, which is a policy decision that probably
ought to be made by civilian officials) the potential risks associ-
ated with the operation, then the discussion of the contemplated
operation's legality and morality should at least be open to
debate based on the merits of the particular strike and not fore-
closed outright as categorically illegal or immoral.
b. Whether Targeted Strikes Against Terrorist Actors Using Third-
Party States as Safe Havens Can Be in Self-Defense?
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides the basis for a state to
use armed force in individual or collective self-defense." The
"inherent right" of self-defense stems from the underlying just
war principles of necessity and proportionality-and in the case
of preemptive attacks, imminence-and requires additionally
that the use of force in self-defense be waged in a defensive man-
ner, against the responsible party, and in response to a signifi-
97. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 67 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
98. See COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, supra note 47, at VIII-2; JOINT
TARGETING, supra note 49, at 11-5.
99. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
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cant armed attack. 0 Failure to satisfy these criteria eliminates
the self-defense doctrine as a basis for the use of force.
The Caroline Incident provides an early and enduring formu-
lation of the self-defense principles of necessity and proportion-
ality.o' In 1837, rebels in British-controlled Canada, including
some American citizens, were staging attacks against British
forces stationed in Canada. The rebels had outposts on both the
Canadian and American sides of the riverbanks and were trans-
porting supplies and people from the American to the Canadian
side. British forces learned of this supply line and dispatched
troops to end it. Under cover of night, and at an hour chosen to
minimize the likelihood that people may be injured or killed,
British forces crossed the river into U.S. territory, boarded the
vessel, and unmoored it from the riverbank setting the Caroline
adrift.'0 2 The river's current sent the vessel over Niagara Falls
killing two American citizens who were onboard. The resulting
exchange between the U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster,
and his British counterpart, Lord Ashburton, provided the for-
mulation for the use of force in self-defense. Specifically, both
parties to the correspondence agreed that there must be a show-
ing of "necessity of self-defence, [that was] instant, overwhelm-
ing, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."10 3
This formulation is relevant in the context of combating
transnational terrorist organizations whose leaders are highly
mobile and can continue to plan and perpetuate attacks from
remote locations. To protect itself, a state that is the victim of a
significant armed attack (or an imminent attack) may, under the
theory discussed in this Note, conduct a targeted strike (1) if the
conditions dictate that military force is the only plausible
option.o and (2) when the intelligence is still timely and rele-
vant, thereby "leaving no time for deliberation" to seek authori-
100. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 194 (June 27); O'CONNELL, supra note 46, at
280. But see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 215 (July 9) (separate
opinion of Higgins, J.) (criticizing the I.C.J.-created formalistic requirement
that the armed attack be "by one State against another").
101. GARDAM, supra note 75, at 40.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 40-41 (quoting Letter from Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster
(July 28, 1842), in 30 BRITISH AN) FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1881-1882, 195, 201
(1858)).
104. See supra Section II for this Note's formulation of how the targeting
calculus ought to be determined and under what circumstances it should be
applied.
2012]1 573
574 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF IAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26
zation under Article 42 of the Charter. Professor Anderson
argues that "[s]uch self-defense operations are not governed by
the full panoply of treaty laws that attach to armed conflict."' 05
He argues that limited uses of force, such as precision drone
strikes, triggers neither the application of the "full range of
armed conflict law that applies [in] conflicts between states, nor
the limited Common Article 3 rules that apply to conflict[s] with
a non-state actor."'0o That said, while the full doctrinal rigor of
the Geneva regime might not apply, the "customary standards"
arising out of the just war doctrine-necessity, proportionality,
and distinction-always do, maintaining the legal and moral
validity of the actions.'o' On the other hand, Professor
O'Connell argues that "[s] tates may not use military force against
individuals on their territory when law enforcement measures are
appropriate."'os In situations like the 2002 drone strikes in Yemen
against a terrorist operative and the 2011 strike against al Awlaki
in Yemen, (1) there was no armed conflict occurring in the vicin-
ity of the strike and therefore the only legal authority was the
state's law enforcement power and (2) even if Yemen provided
the U.S. with tacit consent to conduct such operations, a state
"cannot . . . give consent to a right they do not have."1o
But a blanket determination of appropriateness of the use of
military force does not take into account practical realities pre-
sent in a particular circumstance. Webster's formulation in the
Caroline Incident speaks in terms of "no moment for deliberation."
In a scenario where key figures of transnational terrorist organi-
zations deliberately seek safe haven in states that are unable or
unwilling to capture such actors under the default law enforce-
ment authority thereby allowing for the planning and perpetua-
tion of attacks abroad, the determinative criteria should not be
solely and initially whether the use of force is appropriate, but,
more importantly, whether alternative courses of action are relia-
bly available. The "reliably available" determination-along with
the doctrines of necessity, proportionality, and defensive action
against the responsible party in response to a significant attack-
105. Drones II, supra note 51, at para. 14 (statement of Prof. Anderson).
106. Compare id., with Iwr'L LAw Ass'N, supra note 92 (discussing the mini-
mum showing of force required to trigger the law of armed conflict); see also
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 3 opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I].
107. Drones II, supra note 51, at para. 14 (statement of Prof. Anderson).
108. Rise of the Drones II, supra note 25, at 2 (statement of Prof.
O'Connell) (emphasis added).
109. Id.
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would then inform the appropriateness of the use of military
force in self-defense in the particular instance. Such an analysis
would likely support the use of targeted strikes against the opera-
tional leader of a terrorist cell in a state like Somalia, for exam-
ple, where there is no law enforcement authority, but not in
Hamburg, Germany where use of the law enforcement authority
is a reliable course of action."o
3. International versus Non-international Armed Conflict.
The Geneva Conventions recognize armed conflict as either
international conflicts between states or non-international con-
flicts between an incumbent government and domestic insurgent
groups.' ' The current paradigm, however, does not adequately
address armed attacks from transnational actors operating
outside of the nation-state framework. But by nevertheless apply-
ing the current paradigm, the most direct and logical route for a
state that is the victim of a significant terrorist attack to exercise
its right of self-defense against a transnational terrorist entity is
through the principles of state attribution and due diligence
under the international armed conflict framework.
If a host-state under the "due diligence" doctrine "failed to
maintain the required level of vigilance," then that state may be
held accountable for failing to meet its internal obligations "irre-
spective of whether the conduct of irregular forces may be attrib-
uted to the state itself.""l2 This principle was captured in the UN
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which required States
[t]o refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, par-
ticipating in, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist
activities and to take appropriate practical measures to
ensure that our respective territories are not used for ter-
rorist installations or training camps, or for the prepara-
tion or organization of terrorist acts intended to be
committed against other States or their citizens." 3
110. See Dworkin, supra note 50.
111. Geneva I, supra note 106, at arts. 2-3 (applying to international and
non-international conflicts, respectively); Additional Protocol I, supra note 22
(applying to international conflicts); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609.
112. SeeJames Gathii, Irregular Forces and Self-Defense Under the UN Charter,
excerpt in MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 791
(6th ed. 2010).
113. United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/
288, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006).
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But in the Congo case, the International Court of Justice
noted that "while Uganda claimed to have acted in self-defence,
it did not ever claim that it had been subjected to an armed
attack by the armed forces of the [Congo]."' Judge Simma
noted, however, in a separate opinion that the strict standard for
attribution set out in Nicaragua "might well have reflected the
state . . . of the international law of self-defence for a long
time . . . [but] in light of more recent developments not only in
State practice but also with regard to accompanying opinio juris, it
ought urgently to be reconsidered.""' The doctrine of due dili-
gence as an avenue to state attribution, combined with the
required objective level of intensity, as set out in Tadi, therefore
might provide a legal basis for an international armed conflict to
exist within the Geneva paradigm when one state is combating
transnational terrorist actors who have sought safe haven in
another state." 6
B. Procedural Safeguards to Prevent Unchecked Targeting
of Individuals.
In implementing a case-by-case analysis methodology for
determining the permissibility of conducting targeted strikes
against transnational terrorist operatives, certain procedural safe-
guards ought to be instituted to ensure that the targeting state
does not have an unfettered ability to arbitrarily deny targeted
individuals life and due process. In The Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel ("Targeted Killing') case, the Supreme Court of
Israel delineated certain legal safeguards to ensure, or at least
mitigate, the likelihood of illegal or immoral targeted strikes.
First, the strike must occur while in armed conflict.' The
Targeted Killing case was decided in the context of the "constant,
continual, and murderous wave of terrorist attacks, directed at
114. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, paras. 146-47 (Dec. 19). This references the interna-
tional law doctrine of attribution. As a pre-requisite to using force against a
state that allegedly attacked another state by using non-state actors or entities,
the act must be attributed to the state alleged to have committed the act. Judge
Simma questioned the continuing wisdom of the traditionally high level of attri-
bution as declared by the International Court ofJustice in the Nicaragua case in
1986, id. 336-37 (separate opinion of Simma, J.).
115. Id. at paras. 9-11 (separate opinion of Simma, J.).
116. See Geneva 1, supra note 106, at art. 2.
117. HCJ 769/02, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel,
57(6) IsrSC 285, para. 16 [2006] [hereinafter Targeted Killing case], translation
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/02/690/007/a34/0200 7 690.
a34.pdf; see also PIAw, supra note 9, at 237-49 (summarizing the legal, moral,
and political safeguards).
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Israelis" by terrorist organizations.' 8 The attacks on Israel were
geographically concentrated. In the context of al Qaeda and
other transnational terrorist organizations that export their
attacks from geographically remote cells, however, it will be diffi-
cult to show the same concentration of attacks that were exper-
ienced in Israel. Perhaps an alternate approach should be
considered to account for the U.S. military's targeting methodol-
ogy, which determines and prioritizes the military necessity of
the target and then weighs the legal merits of conducting such a
strike."' The second legal safeguard that the Targeted Killing
court implemented was to place a heavy burden on the targeting
state to ensure that "sufficient indications [are present] to war-
rant an attack."" The Israeli court did not require that the
targeting state, in the heat of armed conflict, receive authoriza-
tion by a court or neutral party. Instead, the Targeted Killing
court implemented a third safeguard: a post hoc review mecha-
nism by requiring "a thorough investigation regarding the preci-
sion of the identification of the target and the circumstances of
the attack."' 2 1 Such a review would enable transparency and fos-
ter political accountability for states that employ targeting poli-
cies. Related to this safeguard, the Targeted Killing court required
a post hoc objective investigation when a targeted strike resulted
in the deaths of either the target or innocent bystanders to allow
for judicial review, when necessary.' 2 2 The Israeli court's next
safeguard, which has already been discussed in this Note, restricts
the use of targeted strikes if "less harmful means can be
employed."' 2 ' As this Note argues, the state's law enforcement
authority ought to be employed when it is a reliable course of
action and only in the absence thereof should a targeted strike
be considered. Finally, the Targeted Killing case reaffirmed the
proportionality requirement and affirmatively placed the burden
on the targeting state to balance the competing interests of "pro-
tect[ing] the lives of its soldiers and civilians" against the "duty to
protect the lives of innocent civilians harmed during attacks on
terrorists. "124
118. Targeted Killing case, para. 16 (citation omitted).
119. See supra notes 51 (describing the criteria to conduct a targeted
strike) & 86 (discussing the targeting methodology employed by the U.S.
military).
120. Targeted Killing case, para. 40 (citing I J. I. HENCKAERTS & L. Dos-
WALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2005)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at para. 54.
123. Id. at para. 40; see also O'Connell, supra note 25, at 2 (discussing the
availability of law enforcement as a reliable, less harmful means).
124. Targeted Killing case, para. 46.
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Additionally, certain moral safeguards might also be appro-
priate and help enhance the authority upon which the targeting
state acts. One such proposal takes one of the Targeted Killing
court's recommendations-the targeting state's burden of
proof-and requires prior approval from an "independent over-
sight authority" to ensure that such strikes are consistent with the
military objectives, are proportional, and mitigate the perception
that such strikes are done arbitrarily."' Such a process is likely
workable for individuals on pre-designated classified target lists.
A panel can review, in advance, the merits of a proposed strike in
light of the presumed general location of the individual. If the
factors present indicate that the individual is cleared as a target,
then the use of force may be employed when the target has been
located and the general location corresponds with the criteria
presented before the panel.
Moreover, with respect to the principles of proportionality
and discriminating between the target and innocent civilians, a
targeting state's moral authority for a targeted strike is greater if
it exposes its own forces to "considerable risk" in order to miti-
gate the risk to innocent civilians, even if alternative weapons,
such as unmanned drones, are capable of accomplishing the mis-
sion at less risk to the targeting state's military but at greater risk
to innocent bystanders.' 26 The U.S. special operations raid into
Osama bin Laden's compound in a Pakistani suburban neighbor-
hood in May 2011 illustrates this point.127 By internalizing as
much of the risk as possible, the targeting state bolsters its case
that it sought to ensure the response was proportional and dis-
criminated the target from innocent bystanders to the maximum
extent possible. That said, the continued development in weap-
ons precision and effects have minimized the collateral risk to
bystanders and to military forces alike.121
Finally, when employing force, the leader of a sovereign
state must act within the constraints of the law. But sometimes
those constraints are untenable in the face of certain novel and
grave threats to national security. In other words, the law might,
in certain circumstances, bar a leader from exercising his or her
moral duty to defend against an attack. In those scenarios, lead-
ers have a moral duty to act, consistent with the just war doctrine,
in self-defense to prevent or mitigate such danger-within the
125. See PiAw, supra note 9, at 248.
126. Id. at 249.
127. Peter Baker & Helene Cooper, Qaeda Leader Reported Dead in 'Targeted
Assault', N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2011, at Al.
128. Bergen & Tiedernann, supra note 71, at 13.
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constraints of practical wisdom.129 The rule of law must prevail,
but probably not at the expense of a morally justified action to
preserve the safety and security of a nation. The law of armed
conflict is the product of an evolution of moral and legal thought
that has sought to strike a balance between the necessity for the
use of force in certain prescribed situations and the fundamental
right to life."so In the common law tradition, when statutory law
fails to address an ambiguity in a legal problem, courts have
relied upon the common law to fill the gaps. Likewise, when the
nature of the threat has fundamentally changed and the treaty
and customary law currently in place fails to address such a
threat, universal moral principles-the driving force behind the
treaty and customary law-ought to be relied upon to fill those
gaps.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law of armed conflict has limited, and should continue
to limit, the use of armed force to only certain instances when no
reliable alternative is available. All things being equal, the use of
armed force to capture or kill transnational terrorist actors
should be secondary to the default use of the state's law enforce-
ment power. But such a principle presumes that the law enforce-
ment power of a state is willing and able to seek out such actors.
Transnational terrorist organizations have the capability and flex-
ibility to plan and perpetuate devastating attacks from geographi-
cally remote locations-locations specifically calculated to
provide the most autonomy from the state's law enforcement
authority. In such circumstances, a fact-specific determination
ought to be used when determining whether to employ a
targeted strike against a terrorist operative. Factors to be consid-
ered include: (1) the necessity for conducting such a strike in
terms of (a) whether reliable alternative measures are available,
(b) the value of the direct military objectives to be achieved, and
129. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics bk II, at 1106b35-1107al
(Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford Univ. Press ed. 2002) (c. 384 B.C.E.)
(describing the "excellence" of practical virtue as the virtue of issuing decisions
"depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being determined by
rational prescription and in the way in which the wise person would determine
it"). But see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MoRAis 84
(H. J. Paton, trans., Harper Perennial Modern Thought 2009) (describing the
"categorical imperative" as the "imperative of morality" requiring unconditional
adherence to laws and norms that are universally recognized).
130. GARDAM, supra note 75, at 2 ("IHL is commonly described as a bal-
ance between the demands of military necessity and considerations of
humanity.").
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(c) the risk of inaction on the part of the targeting state in hopes
that the host-state's police force can adequately address the situa-
tion; (2) the proportionality of conducting a targeted strike rela-
tive to the underlying reasons for doing so; (3) the magnitude of
the risk for collateral damage and the ability to mitigate or elimi-
nate the risk of unintended casualties under the principle of dis-
tinction; and (4) the proximity to actual combat when
considering the preceding criteria.
In a world where states are the predominant unit of analysis
in international law, such an approach may intrude upon sover-
eignty and may, therefore, be doctrinally imperfect-but it is a
solution that provides a workable framework for those decision-
makers in positions of authority and accountability who must
address, in short and unpredictable order, the threat of transna-
tional terrorist organizations in a legal and moral manner, given
the highly mobile and amorphous nature of these actors. The
just war doctrine was fashioned out of practical necessity to com-
bat foreign groups threatening the domestic peace. Such practi-
cal necessity should continue to animate the modern law of
armed conflict with respect to targeted strikes of individuals seek-
ing safe haven to plan and perpetuate further attacks while
outside the combat zone.
